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Abstract
At A71/B96–7 Kant explains that singular judgements are ‘special’ because
they stand to the general ones as Einheit to Unendlichkeit. The reference to
Einheit brings to mind the category of unity and hence raises a spectre of
circularity in Kant’s explanation. I aim to remove this spectre by interpreting
the Einheit-Unendlichkeit contrast in light of the logical distinctions
among universal, particular and singular judgments shared by Kant and
his logician predecessors. This interpretation has a further implication for
resolving a controversy over the correlation between the logical moments
of quantity (universal, particular, singular) and the categorial ones (unity,
plurality, totality).
Keywords: Kant, singular judgement, logical extension, unity, inﬁnity
In the Critique of Pure Reason, the basic forms of judgement are given in
this 4 (titles)× 3 (moments) diagram:
quantity
(universal, particular, singular)
quality 
(affirmative, negative, infinite)
relation
(categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive) 
modality
(problematic, assertoric, apodictic).
Such is the table of judgements, which serves as the basis for constructing
the table of categories.1 If the derivation of the latter table directly
appeals to transcendental logic, all the moments in the former table
are allegedly identiﬁable in general logic alone. As Kant puts it in the
Prolegomena, to build this table he has ‘the [already ﬁnished] work of the
logicians’ lying before him (Prol. 4: 323). There is a noticeable departure
Kantian Review, 19, 3, 367–392 © Kantian Review, 2014
doi:10.1017/S1369415414000168
VOLUME 19 – 3 KANTIAN REVIEW | 367
http://journals.cambridge.orgDownloaded: 01 Oct 2014 IP address: 64.134.69.88
on Kant’s part, however, from the logicians in treating the forms of
judgement as to quantity and quality. For them there are only four
such forms: universal afﬁrmative (A), universal negative (E), particular
afﬁrmative (I), particular negative (O). When they do mention singular
and inﬁnite judgements, they treat the former as universal and the latter
as afﬁrmative. Thus Kant readily admits that his including ‘singular’ and
‘inﬁnite’ has deviated from ‘the customary technique of the logicians’,
and ﬁnds it necessary to issue certain ‘caveats (Verwahrungen) against a
worrisome misunderstanding’ (A70–1/B96).
Whatever misunderstanding Kant is trying to forestall, the reasons he
gives for including ‘singular’ and ‘inﬁnite’ have caused more concerns
than they might resolve. The most pressing concern has to do with the
standpoint from which such reasons are given. When explaining why the
singular and the inﬁnite constitute two ‘special member[s] of the classi-
ﬁcation’ under quantity and quality, respectively, Kant appeals to trans-
cendental logic—explicitly so with inﬁnite judgements, though only
implicitly so with the singular ones (A71–2/B97). Such an appeal, as
Brandt puts it, raises a spectre of circularity. Brandt proposes to remove
the spectre by distinguishing two aspects of transcendental logic, a
‘transcendental-philosophical’ and a ‘purely formal’ one: if Kant must
invoke transcendental logic to include ‘singular’ and ‘inﬁnite’ in the table
of judgements, he needs only to consider its ‘purely formal, not yet
transcendental-philosophical aspect’ (Brandt 1995: 73–5). If, in making
this proposal, Brandt assumes that general logic does not contain suitable
resources for distinguishing the singular from the universal or the inﬁnite
from the afﬁrmative, other commentators have suggested otherwise.
Allison, for instance, argues that the appeal to transcendental logic does
not show that the relevant distinctions cannot bemade in Kantian general
logic in the ﬁrst place (Allison 2004: 141–2). To this wemay add Krüger’s
remark that transcendental-logical considerations serve only to make the
putative general-logical distinctions ‘relevant’ (Krüger 1968: 333–56).
But neither Allison nor Krüger has identiﬁed any general-logical resour-
ces for making the said distinctions.2
I share Brandt’s concern to remove the spectre of circularity he sees in
Kant’s justiﬁcation for including ‘singular’ and ‘inﬁnite’ in the table of
judgements. But I am not convinced that this invites a distinction between
purely formal and transcendental-philosophical aspects of transcenden-
tal logic. If the question of circularity comes down to whether Kant has
adequate general-logical resources for drawing the singular-universal
and inﬁnite-afﬁrmative distinctions, Allison and Krüger have suggested a
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simpler way to resolve it: Kant can draw the distinctions within general
logic, even though afterwards he may invoke transcendental logic to
make them relevant to his project in the Critique. To ﬂesh out this sug-
gestion we must answer these questions ﬁrst. What are the relevant
general-logical resources? And how may Kant consistently assert the
distinctions in question while maintaining that the logicians are right to
treat singular judgements as universal and the inﬁnite ones as afﬁrmative?
In this paper I address these questions as they pertain to Kant’s account of
singular judgements at A71/B96–7. In section 1, I spell out the circularity
threat speciﬁc to this account, as is suggested by Kant’s claim that the
singular judgement has a special place in the table of judgements because
it represents unity (Einheit), which naturally brings to mind the category
of unity. In section 2, I clarify Kant’s view of singular judgement by
comparing it with that of his predecessors: though they distinguish uni-
versal, particular, and singular judgements in a similar way, Kant adopts
a different perspective in the Critique to evaluate the distinction, so that
the singular does emerge as a special form of judgement. I explain that,
when Kant relates ‘singular’ with ‘unity’ at A71/B96, he need not con-
ceive the latter as the category of unity and hence need not presuppose
any substantive connection between the logical moments of quantity
(universal, particular, singular) and the categorial ones (unity, plurality,
totality). By thus weakening the link between two occurrences of Einheit
– one at A71/B96 and one in the table of categories – we can hope to
resolve the circularity threat presented in section 1. This move has a
further implication, I argue in section 3, for the controversy about how
the logical moments of quantity should correlate with the categorial ones.
I conclude (section 4) by outlining a general issue about how general logic
relates to Kant’s project of metaphysical deduction, with respect to which
the further implication of my reading may be appreciated.
1
Kant gives a two-fold account of singular judgements at A71/B96–7, to
show why its inclusion in the table of judgements is justiﬁed despite how
it has been treated by ‘the logicians’. The logicians are right, he grants, to
treat singular judgements like universal ones: ‘just because they have no
extension at all, their predicate … holds of that concept [of the subject]
without exception, just as if the latter were a general concept with an
extension, with the predicate applying to the whole of what is signiﬁed’.
Nevertheless, he then argues, a singular judgement differs from ‘a general
one’ and counts as a special moment of judgement: considered ‘merely as
kant on the logical form of singular judgements
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cognition’, the former relates to the latter ‘as unity relates to inﬁnity’
(A71/B96). Kant thus recognizes the apparent tension between treating
singular and universal judgements alike and regarding the former as
unique, and tries to resolve the tension by afﬁxing two different but
presumably compatible perspectives to these treatments. Suppose the ﬁrst
treatment conforms to the logicians’ perspective, the second to a dis-
tinctively Kantian one. What are these perspectives?
It might seem natural to think that Kant is contrasting general-logical and
transcendental-logical perspectives. After all, even though he does not
explicitly mention transcendental logic in explaining why ‘singular’must
be included in the table of judgements, one may read an implicit
transcendental-logical appeal into his explanation; for he begins the next
paragraph, where he justiﬁes the inclusion of ‘inﬁnite’, with the following
claim: ‘Likewise, in a transcendental logic inﬁnite judgements must also
be distinguished from afﬁrmative ones, even though in general logic they
are rightly included with the latter.’3 Thus Longuenesse takes Kant’s two-
fold account of singular judgements to suggest that ‘from a strictly
[general-]logical standpoint, the singular is not distinguished from the
universal judgement because in both alike the predicate is attributed to
the totality of what is thought under the subject’ and that, to render the
singular a special form of judgement, Kant must instead assume a
transcendental-logical viewpoint and treat it in respect of the ‘relation to
sensibility’ (Longuenesse 1998: 139). But why, from this viewpoint,
should Kant think that a singular judgement stands to a general one as
unity (Einheit) to inﬁnity (Unendlichkeit)?
Some commentators have questioned the very intelligibility of the
Einheit-Unendlichkeit contrast. Allison, for example, is bafﬂed by Kant’s
reference to Unendlichkeit: ‘why not totality?’ (Allison 2004: 141). And
Kemp Smith frowns upon Kant’s connecting Einheit with the singular as
opposed to universal judgement: ‘the universal is itself a form of unity, as
Kant virtually admits in deriving, as he does, the category of unity from
the universal judgement’ (Kemp Smith 1923: 192). In expressing these
misgivings, Allison and Kemp Smith share two related assumptions – that
Kant means the Einheit-Unendlichkeit contrast to capture the difference
between a singular and a universal (allgemein) judgement, and that the
Einheit mentioned at A71/B96 is the same as the unity to be introduced
later with the table of categories. Hence for Allison, who supposes
that the universal judgement correlates with the category of totality,
it is puzzling that Kant should refer to Unendlichkeit. For Kemp Smith,
who takes the universal judgement to correlate with the category
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of unity, it seems incoherent for Kant to ascribe Einheit to the singular
judgement instead.
However one may understand the correlation between the logical
moments of quantity (singular, etc.) and the categorial ones (unity, etc.),
the assumption that the Einheit at A71/B96 is precisely the category of
unity poses a serious exegetical challenge. To put the challenge crudely,
this assumption feeds into the suspicion that Kant’s construction of the
table of judgements is ‘artiﬁcial’ and likely driven by the need to coordi-
nate it with a preconceived table of categories.4 Tonelli notes that the two
tables in their ﬁnal shapes occurred around the same time and, on
that basis, speculates that the table of judgements – as it appears in the
Critique – may very well be built on the already ﬁnalized table of cate-
gories (Tonelli 1966: 134, 150). It would be a non-sequitur, of course, to
infer from the fact that the two tables matured around the same time to
the claim that, in the Critique, Kant bases the table of judgements on the
table of categories. Nonetheless Tonelli’s observation, together with the
aforesaid assumption that the reference to Einheit at A71/B96 is but a
reference to the category of unity, points to a circularity threat in Kant’s
argument for including ‘singular’ in the table of judgements. The threat is
roughly this: provided that Kant intends to derive the categorial moments
of quantity from the logical ones, there would be a vicious circle if he ﬁrst
had to distinguish the singular from the universal by invoking any cate-
gory of quantity. To interpret Kant’s account of singular judgements at
A71/B96–7 charitably, then, we have to show that he has other viable
grounds for making the needed distinction.
Most commentators who have attempted such a charitable interpretation
have sought the alternative grounds within transcendental logic. Brandt’s
aforementioned distinction between the ‘purely formal’ and ‘transcen-
dental-philosophical’ aspects of transcendental logic can be seen as one
such attempt: if categories pertain to the transcendental-philosophical
aspect of transcendental logic, Kant’s justiﬁcation for treating the sin-
gular as a special form of judgement may involve only the purely formal
aspect of the same logic. By contrast, Longuenesse straightforwardly
appeals to Kant’s transcendental-logical distinction between sensible
intuition and discursive thought, and suggests that a singular judgement
differs from a universal one in virtue of having a special relation to
sensibility: the former alone ‘refer[s] concepts to what is beyond the dis-
cursive capacity [i.e. to singular intuition]’ (Longuenesse 1998: 139).
Both readings assume that, for Kant, general logic contains no resources
for distinguishing the singular from the universal judgement and that the
kant on the logical form of singular judgements
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distinction can be made only within transcendental logic. This is a
questionable assumption, though. Kant’s concession to the logicians at
A71/B96–7 is not that the singular cannot be distinguished from the
universal judgement in general logic at all. His point is rather that, if both
he and the logicians recognize some general-logical distinction between
the two forms of judgement, the logicians deny that the distinction qua-
liﬁes the singular as a basic form of judgement in addition to the universal
one; and this is because the logicians assess the distinction – as to whether it
makes the singular judgement ‘special’ vis-à-vis the universal one – from a
syllogism-centred viewpoint, a viewpoint that Kant deems irrelevant to
his project in the Critique (but does not reject otherwise).
I shall ﬂesh out this point in section 2, by analysing Kant’s account of
singular judgements at A71/B96–7 in light of some materials from early
modern logics as well as from his own logic corpus. In brief, I take it that
his reason for including ‘singular’ in the table of judgements comes down
to the following triad of theses.
(I) One can distinguish singular from universal judgements within
general logic. Kant and the logicians can agree on this point.
(II) This distinction may then be assessed from different perspectives.
From the logicians’ perspective, to the extent that in syllogisms
singular judgements play no unique inferential role in comparison
with the universal ones, the distinction does not make the former a
basic judgement-form beside the latter. Kant sees this syllogistic
standpoint as irrelevant to his task of constructing the table of
judgements, though. For his purpose, a judgement is seen merely as
‘cognition in general’ regardless of how it may function in syllogisms,
from which perspective the aforesaid distinction does provide the basis
for treating the singular as a special form of judgement.
(III) A further but higher-order account may be needed for why
considering a judgement as ‘cognition in general’ is the appropriate
perspective for Kant to adopt in the Critique. This is where certain
transcendental-logical considerations may be involved (if at all).
I shall focus on explicating (I) and (II).
2
Two statements at A71/B96 capture Kant’s reason for including
‘singular’ in the table of judgements without discrediting ‘the customary
technique of the logicians’: (i) ‘The logicians rightly say that in the use of
judgements in syllogisms singular judgements can be treated like uni-
versal ones (gleich den allgemeinen).’ (ii) ‘If, on the contrary, we compare
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a singular judgement with a general one (mit einem gemeingültigen),
merely as cognition, with respect to quantity, then the former stands to
the latter as unity to inﬁnity.’5 The expression ‘on the contrary’ suggests a
contrast between two ways of viewing a singular judgement, which Kant
restates as that between construing it ‘with respect to its inner validity’
and ‘as cognition in general, with respect to the quantity it has in com-
parison with other cognitions’. The contrast thus involves these two
perspectives: (i′) perspective-s: consider a singular judgement as to its
‘inner validity (Gültigkeit)’, as to how the predicate relates or applies
(gilt) to the subject, insofar as this predicate-to-subject relation deter-
mines the syllogistic use of the judgement;6 (ii′) perspective-c: consider a
singular judgement in terms of its quantity qua cognition in general.
In Kant’s view, a certain ‘logical distinction’ among singular, particular
and universal judgements must be made ‘at the beginning’ before one can
say ‘afterward’ that the singular can be treated as universal in use.7 If, as I
shall explain next, perspective-c turns out to be that from which the said
distinction is made, then it is logically prior to perspective-s. Accordingly,
Kant’s stated reason at A71/B96–7 for including ‘singular’ in the table of
judgements may be rephrased as follows. First, a singular judgement, as
‘cognition in general’, can be logically distinguished from a general one.
Second, having made such a distinction, one may – as the logicians
usually do – proceed to treat singular judgements like universal ones from
perspective-s. But Kant need not take the latter step in the Critique.
Rather he treats a judgement ‘merely’ as cognition in general, i.e. solely
from perspective-c, without regard to its syllogistic use. Hence he
could say: whatever logical distinction has been drawn between singular
and general judgements from perspective-c remains as is; and this dis-
tinction can in turn serve as the basis for including the former in the table
of judgements.
Now we ask: what logical distinction between singular and general jud-
gements, considered as ‘cognition in general’, is Kant in a position to
draw? And in what sense can this purported distinction be cast in terms of
Einheit versus Unendlichkeit? To answer these questions, I shall begin
with a two-tiered distinction held by some philosophers with whose logic
writings Kant is acquainted: ﬁrst, singular versus general judgements;
second, within general ones, universal versus particular judgements. This
two-tiered distinction is clearly present in Kant’s logic corpus. I shall then
introduce a geometrical symbolism – which can also be traced out in
Kant’s logic corpus – to demonstrate, within the bounds of Kantian
general logic, both that a singular judgement stands to a general one,
kant on the logical form of singular judgements
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respecting quantity, as Einheit to Unendlichkeit and that the former can
subsequently be used like a universal one in syllogisms.
2.1
Many philosophers before Kant shared two theses about singular
judgements. First, there is a two-tiered distinction among judgements
respecting quantity.
singular    vs.    general;
universal vs. particular.
Second, a singular judgement can be treated as universal in logical
inferences to the extent that, like the latter, its predicate applies to what
falls under the subject-concept without exception. Both theses can be
found in the Port-Royal Logic, which – with the notion of extension it
introduced into the early modern logic discourse (Frisch 1969: 5) –
initiated the basic framework within which later philosophers would
present their own versions.
In the Port-Royal Logic there is ﬁrst a distinction between a singular idea
and a general or ‘common’ one: the former ‘represent[s] only a single
thing’ or ‘individual’, while the latter ‘represent[s] several things’, which
constitute its extension.8 In these terms is cast the distinction among
universal, particular and singular judgements which ‘arises from the
subject’: a singular judgement is one ‘whose subject is singular’,
on account of which it differs from a general one, whose subject is a
‘common term’; the latter judgement is in turn universal or particular,
depending onwhether its subject is ‘taken in its entire extension’ or ‘taken
only through an indeterminate part of its extension’. But singular
judgements ‘take the place of universals in arguments’ for the reason that
they ‘have a singular subject that is necessarily taken through its entire
extension’, which is precisely what characterizes all universal proposi-
tions: ‘For it makes no difference to the universality of a proposition
whether the subject’s extension is large or small, provided that whatever
it is, it is taken completely throughout.’9
The reason why this observation about how the predicate relates to the
extension of the subject-concept justiﬁes treating singular and universal
judgements alike in arguments has to do with how arguments are generally
understood in the Port-Royal Logic. A basic ‘argument’ is a relation of three
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terms, two of which (the major andminor terms) are compared bymeans of
a third (themiddle term). All arguments are either explicitly syllogistic or can
be ‘reduced to syllogisms if they are valid’.10 The validity of an argument is
determined by how the predicate of each involved judgement relates to the
subject in respect of extension – to wit, by whether the former is afﬁrmed/
denied of the latter through the entirety or only an indeterminate part of its
extension. Thus, having distinguished singular from both universal and
particular judgements (as well as afﬁrmative from negative ones), the Port-
Royal logicians proceed to ‘reduce’ all judgements to four kinds: A, E, I, O.11
Many of Kant’s immediate predecessors distinguish singular from both
universal and particular judgements as the Port-Royal logicians have
done. The versions in Baumgarten (1761), Knutzen (1747) and Crusius
(1747), in particular, contain verbal hints as to why Kant thinks that,
apropos quantity, singular judgements stand to the general ones as
Einheit to Unendlichkeit.12 According to Baumgarten, the quantity
(quantitas) of a judgement concerns the ‘number’ of things falling under
the subject-concept: it is singular or general (communis, gemein), the
latter in turn being universal (universalis, allgemein) or particular
(Baumgarten 1983: §§142–3, 135–41) As Wolff – whose logic Baumgarten
is summarizing – puts it, the subject of a singular judgement signiﬁes
(signiﬁcat) a single thing, whereas that of a general one represents a multi-
tude of individuals (Wolff 1740: §§113–14, 240–1). Similarly, Knutzen
takes a judgement to be either singular, if its subject is a singular concept
representing an individual, or universal or particular, if the subject is a
general concept containing a multitude of individuals under itself (Knutzen
1747: §141). This multitude, as Crusius sees it, is a ‘logical whole (totum
logicum)’ that is ‘of inﬁnite extent (unendlicher Weite)’; and whether
a general judgement is universal or particular depends on whether the
predicate is afﬁrmed/negated of this logical whole ‘without restriction
of its extent’ or with regard to an indeterminate part thereof (Crusius 1747:
§§230–1).
In these terms, the aforesaid two-tiered distinction may be reworded as
follows. First, singular and general judgements differ with respect to the
quantity of what is signiﬁed by the subject-concept. Insofar as the subject-
concept of a singular judgement signiﬁes exactly one individual, while
that of a general one signiﬁes a totum logicum, and insofar as the totum
logicum of a general concept is of inﬁnite extent, the contrast of quantity
amounts to that between one and an inﬁnite multitude. Second, general
judgements are divided into particular and universal ones, depending on
whether the totum logicum is restricted or not.
kant on the logical form of singular judgements
VOLUME 19 – 3 KANTIAN REVIEW | 375
http://journals.cambridge.orgDownloaded: 01 Oct 2014 IP address: 64.134.69.88
2.2
Would Kant recognize this two-tiered distinction among singular, parti-
cular and universal judgements as a logical one by his own standard?My
answer will be yes. But, in anticipation of certain reasons one might have
to doubt such an answer, let me ﬁrst clarify three relevant points about
Kantian general logic.
First, in Kant’s view, general logic ‘exhaustively presents and strictly
proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking’.13 Now to think is to
relate given representations in somemanner. Accordingly every thought –
be it concept, judgement or inference – has both matter (the given
representations) and form (the manner in which they are related). General
logic concerns only the latter.14 In particular, it treats (categorical) judge-
ments solely in terms of the various ways in which given concepts may be
related and conjoined in one thought. This treatment proceeds from a gen-
eral conception of (categorical) judgement with respect to its basic structure:
different forms of (categorical) judgement can be traced to what may be
called the ‘x-a-b schema’ of judgement. This resonates with Kant’s view
that every (categorical) judgement has the form of the cognition of
an object – ‘something x’ – through two predicates: the ﬁrst predicate
(a, ‘logical subject’) is the given conceptual representation of the object,
and the second (b, ‘logical predicate’) is compared with the ﬁrst.15
A judgement thus has two relations: that of a to x and that of b to a.
To borrowKant’s terms, we may regard the ﬁrst as a signifying relation: a
signiﬁes (bedeutet) an object = x, and the object is the signiﬁcation
(Bedeutung) of a in the judgement. To say that b is predicated of a is then
to say that b applies (gilt) to the Bedeutung of a.16
Onemight wonder, though: is there even any room for ‘object’ in Kantian
general logic? Kant occasionally says that general logic treats thinking in
abstraction ‘from any relation (Beziehung) of it to the object’.17Does this
entail that it must treat thinking as if it had no object at all and that any
reference to objects would take us beyond general logic? Answering this
question requires a thorough textual analysis of Kant’s discussions of
general logic apropos its nature and boundary. Here is my answer in a
nutshell, which is based precisely on such an analysis (Lu-Adler 2012: ch.
1). When Kant claims that general logic treats thinking in abstraction
from all relation to the object, he is primarily concerned with distin-
guishing this logic from transcendental logic: the latter deals with the a
priori conditions under which a cognition may be related to objects of
experience, a relation that determines its objective validity; general logic,
by contrast, only considers how given cognitions are related with one
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another, no matter whether they may in turn relate to the objects (of
experience).18 Considered in this light, general logic need not treat thinking
as if it had no object at all. Rather, one may use a thin notion of object = x:
in (categorical) judgements, this x simply stands for whatever is signiﬁed by
the logical subject, regardless of whether any object (of experience) may be
given, to which the conceptmust be related in order to be objectively valid.19
Finally, for the philosophers mentioned above, the distinction between
singular and general judgements boils down to that between singular and
general concepts (or ideas). This distinction might not seem available to
Kant, given that he denies there to be singular concepts in the ﬁrst place.
It is worth clarifying, however, what is exactly meant by such a denial.
Kant actually describes singular concepts in two ways, accepting them
under one description while rejecting them under the other. On the one
hand, there is no singular concept qua ‘thoroughly determinate’ cogni-
tion of an object; for there can be no determinate cognition of an object
by concepts alone, due to their essential generality and discursivity.20On
the other hand, one may speak freely of a singular concept as that ‘which
does not grasp a multitude under itself, but is only a single thing’.21 To
the extent that this captures the singularity of the Bedeutung of a concept
in abstraction from how the individual signiﬁed therebymay be determined,
calling the concept ‘singular’ merely marks its logical feature – that it
purports to signify exactly one object (= x) – without contradicting the
previous point that no object can be thoroughly determined thereby. As
Kant puts it, although a concept by nature can only represent what is
common among several things, its ‘use’ (in judgements) may be general or
singular. For instance, the concept ‘house’ may be used in its capacity qua
general representation, e.g. in the judgements ‘all houses must have a roof’
and ‘some houses must have a gate’; but it may also be used ‘only for an
individual thing: e.g. this house is plastered this way or that’.22Accordingly,
I shall use ‘this A is B’ to express the form of a singular judgement.23
2.3
With these clariﬁcations we can now return to Kant’s claim at A71/B96
that a singular judgement, as ‘cognition in general’, stands to a general
one as Einheit toUnendlichkeit. This reference to judgement as cognition
in general can be read in light of Kant’s two remarks about judgement in
a previous section (On the Logical Use of the Understanding in General):
ﬁrst, judgement is ‘the mediate cognition of an object, hence the repre-
sentation of a representation of it’; second, to judge is to judge by means
of concepts, and all concepts, ‘as predicates of possible judgements, are
related to some representation of a still undetermined object’ (A68–9/B93–4).
kant on the logical form of singular judgements
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These remarks reﬂect the aforementioned x-a-b schema of (categorical)
judgement: to consider a judgement as cognition in general is to see it as a
mediate cognition of an object = x by means of two concepts – a logical
subject that signiﬁes the object, and a logical predicate that applies to the
object so signiﬁed. In these terms Kant may adapt his predecessors’ two-
tiered distinction among judgements of quantity, roughly as follows:
ﬁrst, a judgement is singular or general, depending on whether its logical
subject is used to signify exactly one object (= x) or a multitude of objects
(= x); second, a general judgement is particular or universal, depending
on whether the said multitude – to which the logical predicate applies – is
restricted or not.
This two-tiered distinction may be illustrated with reference to Kant’s
account of the logical extension of a concept. If the subject-concept of a
general judgement is used as a general representation, such generality lies
in the capacity of the concept to represent a multitude of things and hence
in it having an extension.24 One may, Kant suggests, use a circle to
represent this extension: ‘The multitude of things (Dinge) that are con-
tained under the concept is called the logical sphere [a.k.a. extension] of
the concept.…One understands by that… the circle of application, a line
that… comprehends a great space’ (V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 755). Otherwise, a
‘point’ can represent a concept in its singular use.25 This circle-cum-point
symbolism gives Kant a way of referring to the objects (= x) signiﬁed in
judgements without regard to how our concepts may, if at all, relate
(beziehen) to any objects of experience or what those objects may be.
Now take any concepts A and B. With A as the logical subject and B the
logical predicate, three judgements can be composed which differ in
quantity: (i) ‘all A is B’; (ii) ‘some A is B’; (iii) ‘this A is B’. Kant sometimes
uses circles to represent (i) and (ii) as in Figure 1 (R3215, 16: 715;R3036,
16: 627; R3063, 16: 637).
With the circle-cum-point symbolism, Kant can also represent (iii) as
shown in Figure 2.
A B A B
(i) (ii)
Figure 1.
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Clearly, (iii) differs from both (i) and (ii) with respect to the quantity of
what is signiﬁed by A. In (i) and (ii), A is used in its capacity qua general
representation, to signify a multitude of objects = x. In (iii), by contrast,
it is used to signify exactly one object = x; the singularity of such sig-
niﬁcation is the necessary function of ‘this’, which renders irrelevant the
fact that A, qua concept, is capable of representing multiple individuals.
This distinction between (iii) and (i)/(ii) holds for any concepts that may
take the places of A and B, regardless of whether they relate (beziehen) to
any objects of experience. So construed, the distinction indeed belongs to
Kantian general logic – in the sense clariﬁed in section 2.2.
These ﬁgures also help illustrate why Kant casts the distinction between
singular and general judgements in terms of Einheit versus Unendlich-
keit: it is the difference between representing exactly one object and
representing an inﬁnite multitude of objects. A concept, qua general
representation, is applicable to inﬁnitely many objects, when objects are
understood in the mere sense of objects = x, in abstraction from whether
they may be given to us in experience or what particular features they
may have. Accordingly, the multitude of objects signiﬁed by A in the
general judgements (i) and (ii) is inﬁnite. To that extent (iii), where A is
used to signify exactly one object, stands to both (i) and (ii) as Einheit to
Unendlichkeit with respect to quantity. The different ways in which A is
represented in Figures 1 and 2 – as a circle versus as a point – reﬂects such
a contrast: the circle that represents the Bedeutung of A in Figure 1
contains inﬁnitely many points.
2.4
Figure 2 represents an afﬁrmative singular judgement as having this
logical form: the object signiﬁed by the subject-concept falls inside the
extension of the predicate. Now, as I mentioned in 2.1, the subject–
predicate relation in a judgement determines its use in syllogisms (insofar
as logical validity is concerned). So, when Kant agrees with the logicians
• A
B
(iii)
Figure 2.
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that a singular judgement can be treated like a universal one in syllogisms,
we expect him to justify such a treatment precisely in terms of the account
of singular judgements I have attributed to him. But it is not immediately
clear that he meets such an expectation in the Critique.
At A71/B96 Kant states the relevant justiﬁcation thus: ‘just because
[singular judgements] have no extension at all, their predicate is not
merely related to some of what is contained under the concept of the
subject while being excluded from another part of it. Thus it applies to
that concept without exception.’ It would strike modern readers as puz-
zling that a singular judgement or, more precisely, its subject-concept
should ‘have no extension’. Thus Codato declares that Kant’s notion of a
concept without extension is ‘oxymoron’ and ‘border[s] on nonsense’
(Codato 2008: 144). Anderson, by contrast, thinks that such a notion is
indeed meaningful, but only if ‘extension’ refers to the concepts sub-
ordinate to the given concept, not the objects falling under it (Anderson
2004: 512 n. 28). His reasoning seems to be this: the extension of a concept
equals the sum of its subordinate concepts, and a concept has extension only
if it has at least one subordinate concept; the logical subject of a singular
judgement is a concept with no subordinate concept; therefore, it has no
extension. If, Anderson might add, Kant had instead taken extension to
comprise the objects falling under a concept, he would have said that the
subject-concept of a singular judgement, on account of signifying exactly
one object, has a one-member extension rather than no extension at all.
There are two problems with this line of argument. First, it is at odds both
with what Kant usually says about a concept that (purportedly) has
no subordinate concepts and with his characterization of a concept in
singular use. A concept with no subordinate concepts would be a species
inﬁma, which would be a general as opposed to singular representa-
tion.26 Meanwhile, as I mentioned in section 2.2, Kant describes a con-
cept in singular use as that which is used to signify exactly one individual,
not as one without subordinate concepts.27 Second, the aforesaid reason
against ascribing to Kant the objectual notion of extension – i.e. the
notion that the extension of a concept comprises the objects it signiﬁes –
applies more precisely to our modern conception of extension, according to
which a concept with exactly one object falling under it has a one-member
extension. I agree that Kant cannot mean the latter when he takes the
subject-concept of a singular judgement to have no extension. But it does not
follow that he must therefore take extension to be a conceptual one in
Anderson’s sense. In fact, his claim makes perfect sense on an objectual
notion of extension, albeit a characteristically early modern one.
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The said objectual notion of extension is intended for general concepts to
begin with, generality being their capacity to represent a multitude of
objects.28 This implies that a concept has extension only if it applies to
more than one object. Thus, the subject-concept of a singular judgement –
insofar as it is used to signify only one object – is treated as having no
extension. It is in these terms that Kant often explains why a singular
judgement, having no extension, is used like a universal one in syllogisms.
Take ‘Caesar is mortal’ for instance,
no exception can occur here, because the concept Caesar… does
not comprehend a multitude under itself, but is only an indivi-
dual thing …, that is to say, it does not have a sphere
[i.e. extension] at all from which something could be excluded.
… consequently a singular judgement is like the universal one
in use.29
An individual, because it is not a multitude, is not an extension. It cannot
be restricted in the way an extension can: it must be taken in its entirety
when related to something else. Hence the logical predicate of a singular
judgement always applies to the logical subject – to its Bedeutung –
‘without exception (Ausnahme)’ (A71/B96).
To illustrate, in the fashion of Figure 2, use a point to represent the
subject-concept (A) and a circle to represent the predicate (B) of a singular
judgement. The point must be placed either inside or outside the circle.
These two possibilities correspond to the two basic forms of singular
judgement: ‘this A is B’ (Figure 3a) and ‘this A is not B’ (Figure 3b).
The subject–predicate relations exhibited in these ﬁgures – to wit, what is
signiﬁed by A falls completely inside or completely outside the logical
extension of B – are the same as those in the universal afﬁrmative
(Figure 4a) and universal negative judgements (Figure 4b).
(a) (b)
• A • A B
B
Figure 3.
kant on the logical form of singular judgements
VOLUME 19 – 3 KANTIAN REVIEW | 381
http://journals.cambridge.orgDownloaded: 01 Oct 2014 IP address: 64.134.69.88
These ﬁgures help clarify the sense in which a singular judgement has the
same ‘inner validity (innere Gültigkeit)’ as a relevant universal one does,
i.e. the same way in which B applies (gilt) to A in respect of its signiﬁca-
tion. This is presumably Kant’s basis for granting that the former jud-
gement is not ‘special’ vis-à-vis the latter ‘in that [syllogistic] logic which
is limited only to the use of judgements with respect to each other’ (A71/
B96–7). Roughly put, a singular judgement does not count as a separate
basic form of judgement in a logical system where considerations about
syllogistic validity determine the status of a form of judgement. In such a
system, whether a form of judgement is irreducibly basic in comparison
with other forms hinges on whether it plays a distinct inferential role in
syllogisms, which has in turn to do with whether it represents a unique
subject–predicate relation. Since in this regard a singular judgement is no
different from a universal one, it can be treated just like the latter in
syllogisms and, eo ipso, does not count as a basic form of judgement on a
par with the latter.30
Kant grants that one can take this syllogistic perspective to assess the
status of singular judgements. But he is also clear that, with respect to his
project in the Critique, he is not constrained by such a perspective.
Rather, for the purpose of deciding which forms of judgements should be
included in the table of judgements, he suggests that we consider a
judgement merely as cognition in general – namely, as a mediate cogni-
tion of objects by two concepts (x-a-b) – no matter how it may then be
used in syllogisms. In this respect, the distinction drawn in 2.3 between
singular and general judgements qua cognition in general qualiﬁes the
former as a distinct form of judgement respecting quantity. In sum,
[if] we compare a singular judgement with a general one,merely
as cognition, with respect to quantity, then the former stands to
the latter as unity to inﬁnity, and is thus in itself essentially
(a) (b)
A B A B
Figure 4.
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different from the latter. Therefore, … [the singular] deserves a
special place in a complete table of the moments of thinking in
general (though obviously not in that logic that is limited only to
the use of judgements with respect to each other). (A71/B96–7,
my italicization)
Here Kant remains true to his claim that, in sorting out all the moments of
judgement, he can utilize the work of the logicians. As we learned in
section 2.1, the basics of the logical distinctions that Kant draws among
universal, particular and singular judgements have already been laid out
by his predecessors. The difference between his account and theirs is not
that they have overlooked any of these forms. It is rather that, as long as
they take perspective-s and investigate the logical forms of judgement
only with regard to what affects the validity of syllogisms, they have no
cause to grant singular judgements the status of a basic form alongside
the universal ones. Kant in the Critique, by contrast, begins and remains
with perspective-c, whereby singular judgements are ﬁrst distinguished
from the general (and hence from the universal) ones.
On this interpretation, Kant’s account of singular judgements at A71/
B96–7 presupposes nothing about the category of unity, despite its
reference to Einheit. We can thus dispel the spectre of vicious circularity
envisioned in section 1 that, in order to distinguish singular from general
judgements, Kant relies on a preconception about how the logical
moments of quantity relate to the categorial ones (which are themselves
to be derived from those logical moments) – especially about the relation
between singular judgements and the category of unity. On my reading,
in sum, the notion of Einheit at A71/B96 is meant only to capture
the distinctive logical feature of a singular judgement qua cognition in
general (x-a-b), namely that its subject-concept signiﬁes exactly one
object (= x). Even if Kant may eventually connect this feature of singu-
larity with the category of unity, he need not presume any such connec-
tion in order ﬁrst to distinguish singular from both universal and
particular judgements.
3
By thus weakening the link between the occurrence ofEinheit at A71/B96
and the category of unity, my reading has another immediate exegetical
implication: it helps to resolve a controversy about how the logical
moments of quantity should be ordered in the table of judgements and
correlated with the categorial ones. Different sides of this controversy, as
we shall see, proceed from similar assumptions – about the role ofEinheit
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at A71/B96 and about Kant’s basis for including ‘singular’ in the table of
judgements – as the ones that caused the aforesaid circularity threat.
The controversy begins with the observation that Kant presents the
logical moments of quantity in two different orders in various texts:
< universal, particular, singular> (Order I) and < singular, particular,
universal> (Order II). The former can be found in the Critique and the
Prolegomena among others,31 the latter mainly in Kant’s lectures on
metaphysics.32Meanwhile, the categories of quantity are always ordered as
<unity, plurality, totality> . This has prompted discussions surrounding
two questions. First, which of Order I and Order II is the right one? Second,
how should the logical and the categorial moments of quantity correlate?
Especially, should the correlation be universal-unity and singular-totality, or
singular-unity and universal-totality?33 My reading of Kant’s account of
singular judgements at A71/B96–7 undermines two strategies that some
commentators have used to address these questions.
First, it is no longer legitimate to use the explicit connection that Kant
makes between singular judgements and Einheit at A71/B96 to pit one
correlation against the other. Swing argues that Kant’s comparison of
singular judgements to Einheit at A71/B96 is ‘evidence’ that he has in
mind this more ‘natural’ correlation: singular-unity, particular-plurality,
universal-totality (Swing 1969: 20). This assumes that, by comparing
singular judgements to Einheit at A71/B96, Kant is already explicitly
relating them to the category of unity. My interpretation of the Einheit-
Unendlichkeit contrast has queried such an assumption. On my account,
at A71/B96 Einheit simply captures the special logical feature of singular
judgements – that the subject-concept is used to signify exactly one object
(= x). However this notion of Einheitmay later be connected (if at all) to
the category of unity, Kant need not use any such connection to justify his
ascribing Einheit to singular judgements at A71/B96. In other words, just
because Einheit ﬁgures in his argument for including ‘singular’ in the
table of judgements, it does not follow that the argument presupposes
any correlation between ‘singular’ and the category of unity.
Second, my reading also undermines any effort to determine how the
logical moments of quantity should be ordered in the table of judgements
based on how the categorial ones are ordered.34 It is not unusual for
commentators to think that the order of the three logical moments in the
table of judgements must reﬂect how they are to correlate with the three
categories of quantity. Bennett, for instance, argues that in the Critique
Kant should have arranged the logical moments of quantity as
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< singular, particular, universal> and that it is a ‘slip’ on his part to have
reversed the order – precisely because ‘the associated trio of concepts is
given as “unity, plurality and totality”’ (Bennett 1996: 77). Longuenesse
gives a more detailed argument to the same effect, drawing on a footnote
in the Prolegomena where Kant says: ‘if I start from unity (in singular
judgement) and proceed to totality, … I think only a plurality without
totality’, a progression that is ‘necessary, if the logical moments are to be
placed under’ the categories. (Prol. 4: 302) Taking these remarks to mean
that ‘to understand the categories of quantity one must consider their
genesis as parallel to the progression from singular to particular, then to
universal judgement’, Longuenesse thinks that the footnote has ‘answered
conclusively’ the question of whether ‘one of the tables [should] be reversed
(and then, which one?), the correspondence then being singular judgement/
unity, universal judgement/totality’. The alleged conclusive answer is that
(i) the logical and categorial moments of quantity should correlate as
singular-unity, particular-plurality, universal-totality and that, provided it is
necessary to go from unity to totality, (ii) the logical moments of quantity in
the table of judgements should be arranged in Order II as opposed to Order
I, even though the latter is how they are given in both the Critique and the
Prolegomena (Longuenesse 1998: 249).
Given what we saw in section 2, the move from (i) to (ii) is unwarranted.
For the sake of argument we may grant that, to understand how the
categorial moments of quantity may be speciﬁcally derived from the
logical ones, the latter moments must be taken in the progression from
singular to particular and then to universal. But it does not follow that
this is how these logical moments should initially be ordered in the table
of judgements. For, although they may be viewed as the moments of
judgement fromwhich speciﬁc categories are to be generated (in the order
of unity, plurality and totality), they may also be viewed merely as three
basic judgement-forms with respect to quantity, regardless of how par-
ticular categories may be derived from them. Kant indicates the contrast
between these two views in the very footnote that Longuenesse cited,
where he explains the sense in which judicia plurativa is a more suitable
term than judicia particularia for particular judgements.
For the latter already contains the thought that they are not uni-
versal. If, however, I start from unity (in singular judgements) and
proceed to totality,… I think only a plurality without totality, not
the exception of the latter. This is necessary, if the logical moments
are to be placed under the pure concepts of the understanding; in
logical usage things can remain as they were. (Prol. 4: 302)
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This claim contains a notable caveat: we must follow the singular-
particular-universal sequel if these logical moments ‘are to be placed
under the pure concepts of the understanding’ – to wit, if they are con-
ceived as the moments of judgement through which given intuition is
subsumed under the pure concepts of quantity (Prol. 4: 300–2). But this
goes beyond what Kant needs to assume while introducing the singular as
a distinct form of judgement. So he adds that ‘in logical usage things can
remain as they were’, and proceeds to present a table of judgements in
which the three logical moments of quantity appear in Order I: universal,
particular, singular (Prol. 4: 302).
At bottom, the central problem with Longuenesse’s argument for
favouring Order II over Order I is its mixing two questions. It is one thing
to ask (a): how should the logical and categorial moments of quantity
correlate, and hence in what order should we consider the logical
moments so that they may serve as the basis for generating the speciﬁc
categorial ones in the right way? But it is another to ask (b): how should
the logical moments be arranged as they are ﬁrst introduced in the table
of judgements? My reading of Kant’s account of singular judgements at
A71/B96–7 helps to disentangle these questions. On the one hand, an
answer to (b) is adequate if it reﬂects the logical grounds on which certain
forms of judgements are included in the table. If I was right to argue that
Kant’s two-tiered distinction among universal, particular and singular
judgements from perspective-c is his primary basis for including all three
of them in the table, then it is of little importance whether these forms of
judgements are introduced in Order I or Order II. On the other hand, to
address question (a) effectively, one should not dwell on a particular
order in which the logical moments of quantity initially appear in the
table of judgements. For handling (a) takes a different viewpoint from
what has been assumed to introduce those logical moments into the table.
Especially, it presupposes a view about how the speciﬁc categories of
quantity must be derived from the logical moments of quantity. But Kant
need not assume any such view while constructing the table of judge-
ments. Accordingly, we should not expect an exact correlation between
the initial order of the logical moments in this table and the subsequent
order of the categorial moments.
4
To summarize, I explicated Kant’s claim at A71/B96–7 that, even though
singular judgements are rightly used like universal ones in syllogisms, as
cognition in general they stand to general ones as Einheit to Unendlich-
keit, to which extent they constitute a special logical moment of quantity.
huaping lu-adler
386 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 19 – 3
http://journals.cambridge.orgDownloaded: 01 Oct 2014 IP address: 64.134.69.88
I argued that Einheit is meant here just to capture the distinctive logical
feature of singular judgements as cognition in general (x-a-b) – i.e. that
the subject-concept signiﬁes exactly one object (= x) – and that, even if
Kant may eventually connect it with the category of unity, he need not
presuppose any such connection in order to distinguish singular from
general judgements in the ﬁrst place. This reading had two immediate
exegetical consequences. First, it dispelled the threat of vicious circularity
that Kant has to distinguish the three logical moments of quantity by
appealing to the categorial ones, which are in turn to be derived from the
former. Second, it helped to resolve the controversy about how the logical
moments of quantity should be ordered in the table of judgements and
correlated with the categorial ones.
This interpretation hinges on two claims about Kantian general logic, as I
suggested in section 2.2: in this logic, (1) every (categorical) judgement
can be regarded as having an x-a-b schema, in terms of which I explained
what Kant means by ‘cognition in general’ at A71/B96, and (2) a concept
may be taken to signify objects in the most abstract sense (= x), irre-
spective of whether the objects so represented can be given in our sensible
intuition. Now one may ask: granting that my reading has addressed the
aforesaid issues that are speciﬁc to Kant’s account of singular judgements
at A71/B96–7, and granting that (1) and (2) are compatible with his
remark that general logic abstracts from any relation (Beziehung) of
cognitions to objects, are there any general, philosophically signiﬁcant
reasons for attributing (1) and (2) to Kant? I have addressed this question
with respect to (2) at great length elsewhere.35 I now conclude with a
sketch of the larger context in which I take Kant to hold (1).
Note, to begin with, that Kant’s account of singular judgements at A71/
B96–7 is part of a metaphysical deduction, which supposedly establishes
‘the a priori origin of the categories in general… through their complete
coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking’ (B159).
If Kant is serious about this claim, he needs ﬁrst to explain how ‘the
universal logical functions of thinking’ – as they are listed in the table of
judgements – may have been derived independently of the categories.36
This task belongs to pure general logic, which, as Jäsche puts it in the
Preface to the Logik, is ‘regarded [by Kant] as a separate science, existing
for itself and grounded in itself’ (Log. 9: 6): it is ‘a self-cognition of the
understanding and of reason…merely as to form’, and ‘will thus have no
other grounds or sources than the nature of human understanding’.37
More speciﬁcally, given that the essential act of the understanding and of
reason is thinking and that every act necessarily accords with certain
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rules, logic boils down to the cognition on the part of the understanding
and reason with regard to the universal rules of their own act, which
constitute the necessary formal condition of the very possibility of
thinking.38 As a ‘demonstrated science’ or ‘doctrine’, moreover, logic
must derive these rules from certain principia a priori.39
In light of these remarks about the nature and subject matter of pure
general logic, we can say the following about the x-a-b schema in refer-
ence to which singular judgements were distinguished from the general
ones: if the logical forms of thinking in general must somehow be
grounded in the nature of human understanding, the x-a-b schema can be
taken to represent a notion of thinking – namely, the characteristic act of
the understanding – from which certain forms of thinking may be derived
(as rules for relating given concepts in one thought). In particular, if I was
right about the pressure for Kant to establish the table of judgements in
advance and independently of the categories, this notion enjoys the
beneﬁt of having a rich enough structure for deriving at least all three
forms of judgement respecting quantity.40 This is admittedly far from
showing how Kant may derive – systematically and independently of his
account of categories – all the forms of judgement contained in the said
table. It did, however, foreground the relevant materials in his logic
corpus from which such a derivation may be reconstructed.41
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of objects = x, no matter whether they can be given in our sensible intuition. See n. 18.
17 A79/B55. See Log. 9: 17; V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 693. Note, though, that Kant also says that
general logic treats thinking in abstraction from all differences among its objects. (Log. 9:
12; R1620, 16: 40; R1628, 16: 44; R1603, 16: 33; V-Lo/Wiener, Ak 24: 790, 792). See
Lu-Adler (2012: ch. 1) for an explication of how these two characterizations, which
some commentators think are incompatible, actually capture distinct but complimentary
aspects of Kantian general logic.
18 A57/B81–2. Here ‘object’means object of experience, which can be given in our sensible
intuition. It is one thing for a concept to relate (beziehen) to an object of experience; it is
another for it simply to signify (bedeuten) an object = x, in abstraction from the said
Beziehung. This distinction is suggested by Kant’s remark that a concept must ﬁrst have
‘the logical form of a concept (of thinking) in general’, before we inquire about ‘the
possibility of giving it an object [of experience] to which it is to be related’, without
which relation it is ‘empty of content (Inhalt)’ and has no ‘objective validity’ (A239/
B298). See Lu-Adler (2013) for a discussion of the philosophical import of a similar
distinction between the ‘objectual purport’ and the ‘contentfulness’ of (analytic)
judgements.
19 This notion of object, in Kant’s view, is ‘the highest concept of the whole human
cognition’ – higher in a conceptual hierarchy than ‘thing’ or ‘non-thing’, ‘possible’ or
‘impossible’: an object = x ‘can be thought through impossible predicates’ and hence can be
‘nothing’ (V-Met/L2/Pölitz, 28: 543; V-Met/Mron, 29: 811; V-Met/Vigil, 29: 960–1).
20 Log, 9: 99. See Log, 9: 91; V-Lo/Pölitz, 24: 565–7; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 904–5; A68/B93.
21 V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 931. See V-Lo/Pölitz, 24: 578; R3095, 16: 657.
22 V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 909. See V-Lo/Pölitz, 24: 567; Log, 9: 91.
23 Kant uses both proper names and demonstrative pronouns to mark singularity. One
may follow Thompson and turn both into deﬁnite descriptions: ‘“Caius is mortal” has
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the force of “The man who… is mortal” just as “This is F” has the force of “The… that
is here is F”’ (Thompson 1972: 334–5). But a qualiﬁcation is in order: for Kant, this
Russellian conversion would only capture the logical feature of a singular judgement
(that it has a singular Bedeutung), not how this Bedeutung may be determined.
24 V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 911–12; Log, 9: 96; R2902, 16: 567; R2881, 16: 557–8.
25 V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 755; R3095, 16: 657.
26 Many of Kant’s predecessors take there to be species inﬁma, as a general concept that
has under itself no other general concepts (Wolff 1740: §§44–7; Knutzen 1747: §65).
Kant denies there to be species inﬁma in this sense: ‘in the series of species and genera
there is no lowest concept or lowest species, under which no other would be contained,
… For even if we have a concept that we apply immediately to individuals, there can still
be speciﬁc differences in regard to it, which we either do not note, or which we disregard’
(Log, 9: 97; see V-Lo/Pölitz, 24: 569; V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 755).
27 Singularity concerns the use of a concept in judgements. Whether it has subordinate
concepts concerns its position in a conceptual hierarchy qua concept—namely, as an
essentially general representation. So, though ‘house’ may be used to signify just one
object in, say, ‘This house has a red roof’, as a concept it still has subordinate concepts.
28 This is especially clear in Knutzen’s deﬁnition: ‘the extension of an idea is the multitude
of the subjects or of the individuals which are somehow contained under a certain
universal idea or to which an idea of this kind applies’ (Knutzen 1747: §71). Also see
Lambert (1764: §§174–7) and Euler (1858: p. cii), for whom this notion of extension as
a multitude justiﬁes their use of lines and circles, respectively, to represent concepts. For
an in-depth discussion of Kant’s notion of extension and its historical sources, see
Lu-Adler 2012: ch. 2.
29 V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 931; see V-Lo/Pölitz, 24: 578; Log, 9: 102.
30 To say that a singular judgement can be treated just like a universal one is not to say that
it can be used wherever a universal judgement is. More precisely it means the following:
in whichever inference a singular judgement is used, it can be treated just like a universal
one (insofar as the validity of the inference is concerned).
31 Prol. 4: 302–3; V-Met/Mron, 29: 801–2; V-Met-L2/Pölitz, 28: 547.
32 V-Met/Dohna, 28: 626; V-Met/Vigil, 29: 985–7.
33 For a useful overview of the discussions, see Frede and Krüger 1970.
34 This is not to sever all direct links between the logical and the categorial moments of
quantity. I am only challenging the view that Kant must presuppose any such link while
ordering the former.
35 Lu-Adler (2012, 2013).
36 Kant does not take these logical functions of thinking simply as given. Rather, as he puts
it in the (B) Preface to the Critique, we must ‘prove’ them as the formal rules of thinking
in general, whereby we achieve scientiﬁc cognition of them (Bix).Without the said proof,
the logical moments of thinking contained in the table of judgements would not be
entitled as the basis for deriving categories.
37 Log, 9: 14; V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 25. See V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 792 and V-Lo/Dohna, 24:
697, where Kant describes (pure general) logic as a rational science not only in that it is
drawn from reason (i.e. proceeds a priori), but also in that it has reason per se as its
object of investigation. Kant sees it as Locke’s fundamental insight, in his ‘book de
intellectu humano’, to have located the ‘ground of all true logica’ in the nature of human
understanding, even though Locke’s approach to the topic was ‘physiological’—whereas
Kant’s own would be ‘critical’, by separating the pure from the empirical use of the
understanding and studying its rules in abstracto (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 37, 804; see
R4866, 16: 14; R4951, 18: 9; A54–5/B78–9).
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38 Log, 9: 11–13; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 790–1; V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 693. Kant develops this view
of general logic in his logic corpus without any notable reference to his project
in the Critique: it can rather be seen as his response to certain philosophical debates
about the nature, role and subject matter of logic. He sees Locke, Leibniz and Wolff,
among others, as an important part of those debates—e.g. about whether logic is a
‘science’ (canon) or ‘art’ (organon), whether it should serve for the discovery of hidden
truths, and whether logical rules are to be derived empirically or a priori. For his critical
albeit brief remarks about the history of logic that allude to these issues, see Bviii–ix;
Log, 9: 21; V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 701; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 796; V-Lo/Pölitz, 24: 509; R1629,
16: 48. For relevant overviews and discussions of the pre-Kantian developments in
logic and philosophy of logic, see Capozzi and Roncaglia (2009), Jesseph (2013),
Michael (1997).
39 V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 793; V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 694; V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 24. For the relevant
notion of science (Wissenschaft), as a system of cognitions grounded a priori in
principles of which we are conscious, see V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 704; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 891;
V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 49; Log, 9: 139.
40 I am of the view that the x-a-b schema – together with the objectual notion of logical
extension I explained in §2.4 – also provides an adequate basis for distinguishing inﬁnite
judgements, as a distinct logical form, from both afﬁrmative and negative judgements.
But this is another project.
41 I am indebted to Pierre Keller, G. J.Mattey, and especially DanielWarren for discussions
and comments on earlier versions of the paper that led to substantial improvements. I am
also grateful to Henry Allison, Katherine Dunlop, Michael Friedman, Rebecca Kukla
and two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. Any infelicities that may
remain are purely my own.
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